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Abstract: This paper considers that there is an issue with substandard property management 
in New Zealand’s private rental sector because of amateur landlords and that the current 
regulatory regime does little to raise those standards. The registration of landlords and their 
properties is thought to install a means of quality checking landlords and their properties 
and represents a level of regulatory oversight that the current regulatory regime lacks. 
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I PURPOSE 
 
A troubling trend facing the private rental sector (PRS) in New Zealand is the 
unprofessional way private landlords manage their properties and the sub-standard conditions 
of rental properties. This situation is thought to have arisen because there are no mandatory 
background checks on landlords or their properties.1 New Zealand must lift property 
management standards if it is to deliver quality housing to its burgeoning tenant population. 
 
This essay will look at lifting property management standards from a regulatory 
perspective, regulation having the meaning of:2 
 
a sustained and focused attempt to alter the behaviour of others according to defined standards or 
purposes with the intention of producing a broadly identified outcome or outcomes.   
 
After establishing that the behaviour of landlords in New Zealand needs to be, this paper 
will show why it is the responsibility of the State to regulate to address this problem. 
 
The ability of a regulatory regime to alter the behaviour of the regulated community can 
be assessed against three criteria: 
 
1 The ease with which compliance is secured from the regulated community 
 
2 How well the regulator monitors compliance from the regulated community. 
 
3 Whether breaches of the regulation are competently enforced. 
   
When the current complaint-based regime is assessed against these criteria it fails to lift 
property management standards, particularly in regards to repeat offenders. The result being 
that the regime falls short of meeting the need for quality housing options in the PRS. 
 
                                                 
1 Department of Building and Housing Getting the Balance Right: Review of the Residential Tenancies Act 1986 
(2004) at 16. 
2 Julia Black “Critical Reflections on Regulation” (2002) Australian Journal of Legal Philosophy 1 at 27. 
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The creation of a centralised system for registering suitable landlords and their properties 
is proposed as a means of altering the behaviour of landlords. The system operates by 
excluding from the PRS all landlords and properties that fail to meet the requirements of 
registration. The author considers that the goal of better outcomes for tenants is frustrated 
under this system because of the adverse effects enforcing registration has on tenants. 
 
The last part of this paper will discuss what a registration scheme could look like, taking 
inspiration from Scotland’s landlord registration and rental property registration schemes in 
the United States to propose a compromise that aspires to install confidence in the PRS. 
 
II NEW ZEALAND’S HOUSING MARKET 
 
In examining New Zealand’s housing market the important question for the purposes of 
this paper is whether or not market forces by themselves are likely to succeed in regulating 
the behaviour of private landlords. If they can, then regulation which limits contractual 
freedom and creates expense for the taxpayer may not be necessary. 
 
A The home seeker 
  
New Zealanders face significant obstacles in exiting the PRS as a response to poor 
property management. Homeownership rates are declining3 and one of the reasons for this is 
related to affordability. The average value of residential property has increased by nearly 
$100,000 since 2012.4 The Massey University Housing Affordability Index (which takes into 
account average weekly earnings and mortgage interest rates) deteriorated by 7.5 per cent in 
the November 2013 quarter and 3.8 per cent over the year.5 Buying a house is increasingly 
difficult for many New Zealanders.  
 
Therefore more New Zealanders must go renting. There has been a 16 per cent increase in 
households renting their home between 2006 and 2013.6 Increased reliance on rental 
                                                 
3 “2013 Census QuickStats about housing - Home ownership by households ” (18 March 2014) Statistics New 
Zealand<http://www.stats.govt.nz/Census/2013-census/profile-and-summary-reports/quickstats-about-
housing/home-ownership-households.aspx> 
4 “Property Statistics and Trends” Quotable Value Limited <https://www.qv.co.nz/>. 
5 Bob Hargreaves and Fong Mee Chin “Home Affordability Report” (Massey University, Wellington, 2013)  
6 See Statistics New Zealand, above n 3. 
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accommodation can also be attributed to the negative impact of debt on those seeking home 
ownership, changing lifestyle preferences and employment needs.7 An influx of households 
into the rental market creates competition between those who need to be housed for the rental 
properties that are provided by the public and private sectors. 
 
The supply of rental accommodation by the public sector is limited. While Housing New 
Zealand, local authorities and city councils do provide housing support for the less fortunate, 
the State depends on the private sector to fulfil national housing demands.8 In early 2014 over 
5000 people were on the waitlist for social housing.9 The private sector in 2013 housed 83.7 
per cent of renting households compared to the 16.3 per cent by the State.10  
 
New Zealand’s dependence on the private sector to meet the nation’s housing suggests 
that it is important for the State to regulate the relationship between landlord and tenant. For 
many households it is not realistic to expect them to exit the rental market as a response to 
poor property management. Further the influx of households in the PRS creates competition 
between households trying to secure tenancies. Where demand for housing in the PRS 
exceeds supply, the tenant’s threat to end the tenancy does little to influence the behaviour of 
private landlords towards their tenants. Regulation may be used to address this imbalance. 
B “Mum and dad” landlords 
There are no restrictions to who can or cannot be a landlord.11 Do quality controls need to 
be introduced to lift property management standards? Small-time landlords (“mum and dad” 
landlords) dominate the PRS.12 In 2014 52% of investors owned one to three properties with 
only 13% of investors owning 10 or more properties.13 It will be argued that the dominance 
of these “mum and dad” landlords has contributed to a lowering of property management 
                                                 
7 Ministry of Housing Building the Future: Towards a New Zealand Housing Strategy: Discussion Document, 
(Wellington, 2004) at 8-9. 
8 Ibid. 
9 Michael Fox “Housing NZ waiting lists swamped” (9 April 2014) Stuff.co.nz  
<http://www.stuff.co.nz/national/politics/9920658/Housing-NZ-waiting-lists-swamped> 
10 Ibid. 
11 See Department of Building and Housing, above n 1, at 16. 
12 “The Need for a Warrant of Fitness for Private Rental Housing in Christchurch” (July 2013) Community 
Public and Health <http://www.cph.co.nz/Files/WOFRentalHousingFAQ.pdf>. 
13 Cameron Bagrie, David Croy, Mark Smith and Steve Edwards “Feature Article: The 2014 ANZ Property 
Investors Survey” New Zealand Economics ANZ Property Focus (online ed, New Zealand October 2014) at 7. 
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standards and housing quality because of their typically unprofessional and “hands-off” 
approach to property management. 
 
Investment in residential property attracts a large number of investors because of the high 
demand for housing.14 By comparison large corporate landlords are rare, with estimates 
showing that only 13 per cent of landlords own 10 or more properties.15  
The lack of corporate landlords in New Zealand can be explained by a series of economic 
factors that favour small time landlords. The returns from renting are often too low to justify 
large scale investment. A 2014 survey of New Zealand landlords identified the most common 
reason for not buying another investment property was poor rental returns.16 Potential returns 
are negatively influenced by outgoings such as arrears, tenant damage and necessary 
maintenance work.17 Arrears are a particular problem. Claims for unpaid rent made up over 
70 per cent of the 40,000 of the claims lodged with the Tenancy Tribunal between July 2013 
and May 2014.18  
Against the low returns is the high upfront cost of buying residential property, the values 
of which continue to climb.19 “Mum and dad” landlords may have an advantage over 
corporate investors in acquiring residential property. Many small time landlords have 
inherited or previously occupied property as their investment.20 Part-time landlords may also 
gain a tax advantage by offsetting income from other sources against expenditure on rental 
property investments.21  
The absence of a capital gains tax and increasingly high house prices encourages 
investors to realise their asset and discourages serious commitment to developing a portfolio 
of rental properties.22 The government has recently made moves to discourage such 
                                                 
14 See Department of Building and Housing, above n 1, at 10. 
15 See Cameron Bagrie, above n 13, at 7. 
16 Ibid at 8. 
17 Julie Rugg and David Rhodes The Private Rented Sector: its contribution and potential (Centre for Housing 
Policy University of York, 2008) at 19.  
18 Nikki Preston “Landlords 'too lenient' when tenants go off rails” (10 June 2014) The New Zealand Herald 
<http://www.nzherald.co.nz/business/news/article.cfm?c_id=3&objectid=11270785>. 
19 See discussion at IIA. 
20 See Department of Housing, above n 1, at 17. 
21 Ibid. 
22 See discussion at IIA and Geordie Hooft “More details on the coming capital gains tax on property” (14 July 
2015) Stuff.co.nz  
http://www.stuff.co.nz/the-press/business/70183062/more-details-on-the-coming-capital-gains-tax-on-property  
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speculation by taxing the profits made on reselling a property last purchased within two 
years.23 This rule does not include properties inherited or transferred as part of a relationship 
which are two key ways that “mum and dad” landlords enter the PRS.24 “Mum and dad” 
landlords continued to be favoured over large landlords. 
C Poor property management 
 
It is argued that a number of “mum and dad” landlords inadequately manage their 
properties due to their unprofessional or “hands off” approach. This is a behaviour that needs 
to be altered if better housing outcomes are going to be achieved for New Zealand’s tenants. 
 
A laissez-faire approach does not favour tenants because of the poor conditions of rental 
properties. Only a small proportion of stand-alone houses in New Zealand are purpose-built 
for being rented to the public.25 Consequently many rental properties are old, most over 10 
years old, with over one fifth being older than 50 years.26 A rental sector of older housing 
stock creates issues in terms of housing quality due to deterioration or out-dated building 
techniques. A variety of surveys and studies have confirmed that dampness, mould and other 
housing quality issues are a greater problem in the PRS than in owner-occupied housing.27 
The issue of inferior housing stock in the PRS is exacerbated by a “hands-off” approach. 
A national survey of landlords managing a single property found that 69 per cent had “no 
known budget” when asked about their annual budget for maintenance.28 Around 21 per cent 
dedicated less than $2,500 to maintenance each year.29 
 There is also neglect when it comes to property inspections with 36.4 per cent of “mum 
and dad” landlords responding that they failed to regularly inspect their property.30 Recently 
                                                 
23 Ibid. 
24 Ibid. 
25 See Department of Building and Housing, above n 1, at 15. 
26 Saville-Smith, K and Fraser, R National Landlords Survey: Preliminary Analysis of the Data (Wellington: 
CRESA, 2004) at table 3. 
27Sarah Bierre, Mark Bennett and Philippa Howden-Chapman “Decent Expectations? The use and interpretation 
of Housing Standards in Tenancy Tribunals in New Zealand” (2014) 26 NZULR 153 at 158. 
28 See K Saville-Smith and R Fraser, above n 26 at table 7. 
29 Ibid. 
30 Ibid at table 14. 
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an article was written on a Waikato landlord who took over 12 months to repair his rental 
property and leaky water pipes had caused parts of the floor to fall in.31 
Notably a national survey of landlords saw many respondents citing retirement income as 
the main benefit of owning a rental property.32 The association of landlordism with 
retirement in New Zealand reflects an attitude that being a landlord is different from 
assuming a profession or a career. It is perceived as a low maintenance investment not 
requiring any special skill or effort.  
This laissez-faire attitude is further reflected by the fact that relatively few landlords use 
professional property managers or real-estate agents to manage their property on their 
behalf.33 There is a perception that the services are an unnecessary cost.34 However it is at 
least arguable that the increased use of such services would bring with it a level of proactivity 
that is missing in the sector.35 Of course, such professionals are not immune to poor 
practices,36 but it may be that they have a greater commercial incentive to improve their 
practices than “mum and dad” landlords in order to market their services. 
Given that the take up of professional agents has been slow it is important that “mum and 
dad” landlords are educated about their rights and obligations under tenancy law. Groups 
such as the New Zealand Property Investors Federation (NZPIF) provide such opportunities 
to its members through publications, workshops and advice.37 The NZPIF has a significant 
reach with 20 local Property Investors' Associations throughout the country with a significant 
number of landlords frequently attending monthly meetings.38  
A laissez-faire approach may not always result in a bad outcome for the tenant. 
Undoubtedly many tenants value the independence. However it is central to renting that the 
property is regularly maintained and that landlord and tenant respect each other. The 
                                                 
31 Elton Smallman “Landlord didn't realise home was in bad State” (24 October 2014) Stuff.co.nz 
<www.stuff.co.nz/waikato-times/news/10656286/Landlord-didn-t-realise-home-was-in-bad-State> 
32 See K Saville-Smith and R Fraser, above n 26, at 9. 
33 See Cameron Bagrie, above n 13, at 7. 
34 Helena Harbrow “The Dilemma Facing Landlords and Tenants: Enforcing Tenancy Tribunal Orders While 
Upholding Privacy Interests” (2005) 36 VUWLR 581 at 584 
35 See Department of Building and Housing, above n 1 at 18. 
36 Ibid.  
37 See Helena Harbrow, above n 34 at 583. 
38 “Investor Associations” New Zealand Property Investors Federation  
<http://www.nzpif.org.nz/items/view/55216/associations>  
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unprofessionalism of property management in the PRS suggests a need for regulatory steps to 
be taken. 
D Conclusion 
Market forces by themselves cannot be relied upon to raise property management 
standards in the PRS. The lack of housing options available to tenants puts them in a weak 
bargaining position vis-à-vis private landlords. The increasing reliance on private landlords is 
a cause for concern because their unprofessionalism and laissez-faire management prejudices 
the interest tenants have in quality housing. Having established a need to lift property 
management standards, the question becomes: why is it the State’s responsibility to regulate 
to address this issue? 
III THE RESIDENTIAL TENANCY AGREEMENT  
 
The difficulty in deciding how and why to regulate residential tenancies can be attributed 
to the conflicting ways the tenancy is viewed by the various stakeholders involved. Any 
regulation will necessarily be a compromise between these interests, deciding which interests 
to promote and which to suppress. This part will evaluate the different interests involved in a 
residential tenancy agreement to determine whether a response from the State is justified. 
 
A Private contract 
 
A tenancy agreement in the PRS is prima facie a private agreement. A private landowner 
grants the right to occupy the premises to another private person in consideration for regular 
rent payments. In one landlord’s view a tenancy is simply a:39 
 
…private business deal between…two parties, bond and all. It has absolutely nothing to do with the 
Government or the Housing Corporation... If I own a property and decide to rent it out I feel I have a right to 
call the tune - it is not for the Government to handcuff me in making a private business deal.  
 
This conception of tenancy is often cited by landlords as a reason for why the State 
should not regulate tenancies. Regulation impinges on a person’s freedom to deal with their 
                                                 
39 I. Mackey. “Submission made to the Social Services Select Committee hearing submissions on the Residential 
Tenancies Bill 1985” numbered lW. 
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asset as they see fit. Landlords do not rely on the State save to the extent of enforcing their 
contracts.40  
 
Freedom of contract is important because it allows parties to structure their relations in a way 
which best suits their circumstances and interests.41 With tenants as an increasingly portion of 
the population, flexibility is needed to meet the range of their housing needs. Regulation 
encroaches on this freedom by limiting the terms which the parties can agree to, implying 
terms into the contract and requiring other procedural requirements before the parties can call 
upon the State to enforce the agreement. 
 
The freedom of contract rationale is bolstered by the law’s high esteem for property 
rights. Property rights are generally enforceable “against the world”.42 Property can be used 
for any lawful purpose, including leasing it to others.43 However property rights are not 
completely indefensible because the State can exercised its power to compulsorily seize 
property.44 This indicates that a freedom of contract or indefeasibility of property rights 
analysis in not a full answer to the question of whether the State should regulate or not. 
Clearly property rights are compromised on when it is in the public interest to do so. 
 
Further the freedom of contract argument assumes that both parties have equal bargaining 
power in negotiating terms.45 The landlord is often going to be in a stronger position. They 
are likely more knowledgeable about the state of their property by virtue of their ownership. 
Many tenants are from lower socio-economic groups and thus may have difficulty 
appreciating what they have signed up for.46 The tenant is at a further disadvantage in that 
they face the increasing likely prospect of homelessness if they cannot agree to the terms of 
the lease. With a range of tenants being called to attend open homes, landlords can choose the 
tenants who are most compliant with their terms.  
 
                                                 
40 Anthony Kronman “Contract Law and the State of Nature” (1985) 1 JLEO 5 at 5. 
41 Ibid. 
42 See generally, S Bright, “Of Estates and Interests: A Tale of Ownership and Property Rights” in S Bright and 
J Dewar, Land Law: Themes and Perspectives (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2013). 
43 Ibid. 
44 Public Works Act 1981, s 16. 
45 Kate Tokeley Consumer Law in New Zealand (Butterworths, Wellington, 2000) at [1.3.1]. 
46 Ministry of Social Development Household Incomes in New Zealand: Trends in Indicators of Inequality and 
Hardship 1982 to 2011 (Wellington: Ministry of Social Development, 2012). 
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While a tenancy agreement is prima facie a private contract, this conception favours the 
interests of the landlord. Tenants often lack the power to effectively bargain for the terms 
which are in their interests to do so. This inequality may provide a rationale for State 
regulation.  
 
B Business transaction  
 
The corollary of viewing tenancy as a private agreement is its conception as a business 
transaction. The main reason landlords lease their property is to realise a return from their 
investment.47 These returns must be enough to justify the landlord not selling their property 
and realising capital gain. From this perspective, regulation must appreciate the landlord’s 
need to earn a profit. 
 
Regulations that require landlords to meet certain standards or to otherwise spend money 
in order to lease their property may mean that renting becomes a less profitable venture for 
the landlord. However from a long term perspective such standards may actually benefit the 
landlord. It may mean that landlords do not spend as much money and effort fighting tenants 
over maintenance issues and it may also increase the value of their property for when the 
landlord decides to sell. Given the State’s dependence on the PRS to provide housing, cost is 
an important consideration to take into account when considering the degree to which to 
regulate residential tenancies. At least the State may need to identify incentives for landlords 
so as to counteract such costs. 
 
C A home 
 
With more families and older people renting, rental property is more often being 
characterised by the tenant as their ‘home’ rather than simply a means of short term 
accommodation.48 The conception of the tenancy as a home deemphasises the landowner’s 
freedom to do what they wish with their asset and values the social advantages of affordable, 
stable and good quality housing. This conception often conflicts with a business-orientated 
perspective that does not look beyond the need to remain competitive in the housing market. 
                                                 
47 Shamubeel Eaqub and Selena Eaqub Generation Rent Rethinking New Zealand’s Priorities (Bridget Williams 
Books, Wellington, 2015) at 54. 
48 Ibid at 56. 
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Given the deficiencies that have been discussed in regards to the housing market it is not 
likely that the conception of the tenancy as a home will be protected without State regulation. 
 
D A consumer product 
 
While emphasising tenancy as a ‘home’ may be a subjective conception that brings 
unnecessary sentimentalism into the law, the need for State regulation could be argued for 
from the perspective of consumer law. It is clear that rental property is not a passive 
investment like that in shareholdings or some other commodity; rather the activity is properly 
part of the service industry.49 The consequence of ill-advised dealings in shares is primarily 
economic loss; the consequence of poor property management is potentially the health and 
safety of the tenant. Tenants readily satisfy the definition of a consumer in the Consumer 
Guarantees Act 1993 as a person who:50 
 
 (a) acquires from a supplier goods or services of a kind ordinarily acquired for personal, 
domestic, or household use or consumption; 
 
The tenant acquires the services of the landlord because they receive accommodation. 
This accommodation is clearly acquired for domestic use. If tenants are consumers then they 
should receive the guarantees of information, quality, safety and other guarantees afforded by 
the State to consumers generally.51   
 
It is not clear whether in reality a tenant could bring a claim under the Consumer 
Guarantees Act.52 The Law Commission has argued that residential tenancies should be 
explicitly excluded from the Consumer Guarantees Act because they are “adequately 
protected by the mechanisms to be found in the Residential Tenancies Act 1986”.53 
Nevertheless the Consumer Guarantees Act provides an analogous precedent for the State to 
intervene in the market and to provide statutory guarantees to protect weaker parties from the 
perceived harshness of the operation of the freedom of contract doctrine. 
 
                                                 
49 Gordon Stewart “The Residential Tenancy Bond in New Zealand” (LLM dissertation, Victoria University of 
Wellington, 1989) at 1.06. 
50 Consumer Guarantees Act 1993, s 2(1). 
51 Consumer Guarantees Act, s 1A. 
52 Barry Barton Energy efficiency and rental accommodation: dealing with split incentives. Report for the 
University of Waikato Centre for Environmental, Resources and Energy Law. Hamilton: University of Waikato, 
2012 at 9. 
53 Law Commission Improving the Arbitration Act 1996 (NZLC R83, 2003) at 165. 
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E A health and safety issue 
 
Related to the conception of tenancy as a consumer service, is the idea that tenancy 
should be regulated because of the health and safety issues raised. If the State regulates health 
and safety in the workplace and of the public generally it seems intuitive that the same should 
be true in relation to tenancies.54 This is especially so given the amount of time the tenant 
spends at the property. 
 
A tragic example of health and safety issues involved in tenancies is the case of the 
toddler, Emma-Lita Bourne, whose death the coroner linked to the cold and damp house she 
was living in.55 This was not an isolated event, figures show that each year 40,000 children 
are admitted to hospital with respiratory conditions linked to poor housing.56  
 
Emma-Lita’s case sparked a wider debate in the media that firmly located the State as 
responsible for providing adequate housing for New Zealanders.57 While Emma-Lita may 
have been living in a State home, much of the debate following this tragedy focused on 
substandard private rental properties and calls on parliament to require private rentals to enact 
warrants of fitness.58 The government response in unveiling a plan to require rental properties 
to meet minimum standards shows the responsibility the State has assumed for the PRS.59  
 
It is in the economic interests of the State to regulate health and safety in the PRS. The 
Canterbury District Health Board estimates that a night in hospital costs $14,000.60 By 
comparison it costs under $1,500 to install insulation in a ceiling, an expense which may 
reduce hospitalisations due to cold and damp homes.61 However the cost of making a 
property compliant with health and safety requirements potentially makes renting less 
                                                 
54 See for example Health and Safety in Employment Act 1992 and New Zealand Public Health and Disability 
Act 2000 
55 Adan Dudding “Emma-Lita Bourne death: will anything change?” (14 June 2015) Stuff.co.nz 
 <http://www.stuff.co.nz/national/69335033/emmalita-bourne-death-will-anything-change> 
56 Phill Goff “Phil Goff: Rental homes need a warrant of fitness to keep kids healthy” (14 June 2015) Stuff.co.nz 
<http://www.stuff.co.nz/national/politics/opinion/69307464/phil-goff-rental-homes-need-a-warrant-of-fitness-
to-keep-kids-healthy> 
57 Ibid. 
58 Ibid. 
59 Vernon Small “Rental properties face minimum standards rules” (8 June 2015) Stuff.co.nz  
<http://www.stuff.co.nz/national/politics/69212752/Rental-properties-face-minimum-standards-rules> 
60 “The Need for a Warrant of Fitness for Private Rental Housing in Christchurch” (July 2013) Community 
Public and Health http://www.cph.co.nz/Files/WOFRentalHousingFAQ.pdf . 
61 Ibid. 
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profitable for the landlord. The question then becomes whether the State should recognise 
tenancy as a business transaction and to subsidise the costs of making the property compliant. 
 
F A responsibility of the State  
 
New Zealand has assumed an obligation to provide adequate housing to those within its 
jurisdiction by virtue of its ratification of international human rights law.62 The State must 
now take measures to ensure that housing is adequate.63 This can be achieved in two ways, as 
a housing provider or as a facilitator of “the production and improvement of shelter”.64 
 
Because housing provided by the State is limited in New Zealand, it is more accurate to 
describe New Zealand as taking a facilitating approach. Through this lens, private landlords 
can be seen as agents or delegates of the State in meeting the former’s obligation to provide 
adequate housing. This conception of the PRS was described by Hon R McClay in passing 
the Residential Tenancies Bill in 1986:65 
 
The State cannot manage to house people in some areas now, and there are almost 12,000 people 
on the waiting list for houses. The private sector must be able to assist the State as it always has done.   
 
Private landlords play a public role and are thus distinguishable from other investors who 
pursue commercial gain. As agents, it can be argued that private landlords must accept and 
submit to regulation by the State whom they act on the behalf of.   
 
G Conclusion 
 
While tenancy agreements can be described as a private contract or business transaction, 
they are increasingly seen from a public interest perspective as a health and safety issue, a 
                                                 
62 United Nations “Status of International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights” 
<http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV- 
3&chapter=4&lang=en> and International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 1966, Art. 2(1) 
and 11. 
63 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Art. 11. 
64 Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights The Right to Adequate Housing (Office 
of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Geneva, 2009) at 6. 
65 Hon R McClay (9 December 1986) 476 NZPD 6009. 
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consumer service and a responsibility of the State. These latter conceptions of tenancy are 
strong justifications for why the PRS is properly the subject of regulation. 
 
IV  THE CURRENT REGULATORY FRAMEWORK   
 
If it is accepted that the State has an obligation to regulate the PRS, it follows that it must do 
so in a way that is fair to all stakeholders and provides effective options for redress. It is 
argued that property management in New Zealand’s PRS is not adequately regulated and 
tenants are poorly placed to enforce breaches of tenancy laws.  
 
A Regulatory Goals  
 
Tenancies are poorly regulated in New Zealand because, using the criteria identified in 
section I: 
 
1 Securing Compliance: There are considerable obstacles to landlords complying with the 
rules of the current regime because of the multiple sources of tenancy law they must 
familirise themselves with and there is no compulsory mechanism in place to ensure that the 
parties understand what is required of them. 
 
2 Monitoring Compliance: There are limited means to communicate to landlords that they 
risk breaching property management standards and that they must change their behaviour 
short of having disputes being heard at the Tenancy Tribunal.  
 
3 Enforcement: Tenants, limited by their personal interests, are not in a position to take 
claims against offenders that pose a risk to the public generally. The State’s limited role in 
enforcing tenancy laws burdens tenants with this task. 
 
1 Securing compliance 
 
The Residential Tenancies Act 1986 (RTA) regulates property management by treating 
landlords and tenants as having agreed to the rights and obligations provided for in the Act. 
The rationale is that (a) such terms are necessary for a functioning and fair tenancy and (b) 
17 
 
the parties would not have agreed to such terms because of power imbalances or ignorance.66 
For example the Act deems landlords to have agreed to do maintenance work and the tenants 
to have agreed to repair the damage they intentionally or carelessly cause.67 Generally 
tenancy agreements will not be enforceable to the extent that they are inconsistent with these 
rights and obligations.68    
 
The effectiveness of a regulatory scheme that relies on mandatory statutory terms to 
achieve a result is influenced by a series of factors including understanding of those terms. 
Since landlords and tenants are under no obligation to familirise themselves with the RTA, 
there is the potential for landlords to inadvertently breach the RTA and for equally 
uninformed tenants, to suffer.  
 
However there are many free and readily accessible avenues for people to gain 
information and guidance on the rules. A prospective tenant or landlord can visit their local 
Community Law centre or Citizen Advice Bureau for advice, search the Tenancy Services 
website or ring the Tenancy Services helpline.69 Nevertheless all these options rely on the 
landlord or tenant being motivated to actually seek out this information 
 
Further the RTA is not a comprehensive source of tenant and landlord responsibilities. 
This adds complexity and makes compliance more difficult. Tenancy law being “scattered 
over several Acts” was a problem identified by the draftsmen, but the vision for “all law 
relating to landlords and tenants [being] in one statute” was not fulfilled.70 For example the 
following sections of the RTA require the landlord to familiarise themselves with other 
legislation: 
 
S 12 Discrimination to be unlawful act 
 
(1)Each of the following is hereby declared to be an unlawful act: 
 
                                                 
66 See Tokeley, above n 45, at 1.31. 
67 Residential Tenancies Act, ss 40 and 39. 
68 At s 11. 
69 See Community Law’s website at http://communitylaw.org.nz/, Citizen Advice Bureau at 
http://www.cab.org.nz/Pages/home.aspx, Tenancy Services at http://www.tenancy.govt.nz or call Tenancy 
Services on 0800 836 262.  
70 See Hon PB Goff (19 September 1985) 457 NZPD 6896, Hon PB Goff (19 September 1985) 457 NZPD 6897 
and Bierre, above n 27, at 2. 
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(a)discrimination against any person in respect of the grant, continuance, extension, variation, 
termination, or renewal of a tenancy agreement in contravention of the Human Rights Act 1993 
 
S 66O Landlord may make house rules 
… 
(2)(b)(ii)purport to permit anything that would breach the Privacy Act 1993. 
 
Notably the RTA does not list the relevant grounds of discrimination or what would 
amount to a breach of privacy.  
 
S 45 Landlord's responsibilities 
 
(1)The landlord shall— 
… 
c) comply with all requirements in respect of buildings, health, and safety under any enactment so 
far as they apply to the premises 
 
Section 45(1)(c) introduces significant complexity because it requires landlords to be 
cognizant with: “any [applicable] enactment” relevant to building, health and safety laws”. 
 
Given that discrimination of prospective tenants and low housing quality are both 
significant problems facing New Zealand’s PRS, it is important that landlords and tenants are 
educated about legislation such as the Human Rights Act and Building Act and how they 
pertain to their tenancy.71 The fact that parties must be aware of multiple sources of 
legislation creates a compliance issue and emphasises the importance of educating tenants 
and landlords about their rights and obligations outside the RTA.  
 
The tenancy agreement itself is another source of rights and obligations that the parties 
have to consider, necessitating knowledge of contract principles such as those relating to 
intention, formation and privity, and how those principles interact with legislation like the 
RTA.  
 
                                                 
71 J MacDonald Racism and Rental Accommodation (Social Research and Development Trust, Auckland, 1986) 
at 87. 
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In limited circumstances contractual rights trump the rules in the RTA. Landlords are 
allowed to waive “all or any” of their rights and powers under the RTA or to assume more 
onerous obligations.72 Such freedom is not given in relation to the tenant’s rights and 
obligations.73 This protects tenants from inadvertently or being coerced into reducing their 
entitlements under the Act. Why is the same benefit of the doubt not given to landlords? A 
response would be that landlords are in a stronger position to dictate terms than tenants are.74 
However as has been discussed, there is a view that landlords are not well educated as to their 
right and obligations.75 Therefore it may be overestimating the landlord’s understanding of 
the benefits and perils of contracting out as opposed to maintaining their rights under the 
RTA. 
 
Even without the landlord exception, the RTA allows for freedom of contract if it is 
consistent with the rules in the Act. Parties can agree to various arrangements such as to 
duration, whether the tenancy is fixed or periodic, whether pets are allowed or whether the 
tenancy is incidental to services performed by the tenant.76  
 
While the RTA requires tenancy agreements to be in writing, the lack of writing does not 
invalidate the agreement.77 The terms of oral agreements are often unclear with parties 
relying on circumstantial evidence. The various types of contractual arrangements that are 
drawn up to meet unique living arrangements add significant complexity to the tenancy 
relationship.  
 
The potential confusion arising from oral arrangements and poorly drafted or complicated 
agreements has been mitigated to an extent by the Ministry of Business, Innovation and 
Employment’s (MBIE) provision of standard-form contracts.78 The templates provide a 
room-by-room furniture inventory and the option to strike out terms that do not apply. A 
survey found that the use of such agreements made renting seem “less confusing and 
                                                 
72 Residential Tenancies Act, s 11(2) and Chief Executive Officer (Housing) v Brown (2000) 156 FLR 158 at 
164 per Thomas J (Tenancy Act 1979 (NT) “is not a code in the sense that it sweeps away the application of the 
common law”). 
73 At s 11(3). 
74 See discussion above at IIIA and B. 
75 See discussion above at IIB. 
76 Grinlinton, DP Residential Tenancies: The Law and Practice (4th ed, Wellington, LexisNexis, 2012) at 1.2. 
77 Residential Tenancies Act, ss 13 and 13C. 
78 PDF able for free download from http://www.tenancy.govt.nz/assets/Forms-templates/Residential-Tenancy-
Agreement.pdf  
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fragmented”.79 These templates are widely used and available online or in print and there is a 
wide perception that they are the ‘tenancy agreement’.80  
   
However confusion between contractual obligations and the RTA remains an issue. This 
is illustrated by reliance on the terms of the tenancy agreement in ignorance of the 
requirements of the Act. A common problem is that landlords include clauses in their contract 
requiring the tenant to commercially clean the property when they leave and many tenants 
assuming that this is binding on then in all circumstances.81 However such clauses represent a 
more onerous obligation than what is required of tenants under the RTA, namely the 
obligation to keep the property “reasonably clean”.82 Such clauses are not valid because they 
breach the rule that tenants cannot contract out of the RTA.83  
  
The RTA does not say in positive terms that automatically requiring the tenant to 
commercially clean in the property constitutes a breach. It is an inference made from the use 
of the word “reasonable” in the section 40 requirement that tenants must “keep the premises 
reasonably clean and reasonably tidy”.84 What is reasonable depends on the circumstances so 
it cannot be assumed at the time of contracting that commercial cleaning will be required for 
the tenant to meet the standard when the tenancy terminates.85 
 
The operative word in section 40 is “reasonable” and without further definition it is prone 
to subjective interpretations. This is because of the inherently conflicting ways which tenants 
and landlords view the tenancy.86 A landlord is likely to have a higher standard of 
“reasonableness” because they are conscious of the need to re-let and the property’s 
attractiveness to new tenants. A tenant is likely to have a lower standard of “reasonableness” 
                                                 
79 Diane Lister “Learning lessons from New Zealand — the reform of landlord and tenant law in England and 
Wales” (2004) 11 BCB 58 at 59. 
80 An observation made from the author’s employment as a Client Service Advisor at Tenancy Services 2014-
2015. 
81 Diana Clement “Double check tenancy clauses” (14 April 2012) The Herald  
<http://www.nzherald.co.nz/property/news/article.cfm?c_id=8&objectid=10798612> 
82Residential Tenancies Act, s 40(1)(c)  
83 At 11(3). 
84 At s 40(1)(c). 
85 For example in Harnett Ltd v Payne [2011] NZ TT Nelson 329 all that was required was for the tenant to 
clean the carpet with a Rug Doctor. 
86 See discussion at III, particularly at C. 
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and claim that the landlord is out of touch with what is truly the inevitable wear and tear of 
the property for which the tenant is not responsible.87  
 
The lack of meaningful objective standards has also been discussed in relation to the 
obligation to maintain and repair the property.88 The RTA again uses the word “reasonable” 
with little elaboration to guide landlords and tenants as to what is expected in regards to 
maintenance work.89 This lack of definition is exacerbated by the lack of guidance given 
from the Tenancy Tribunal, the body that hears the majority of disputes under the RTA. This 
may be because of several reasons including the general prohibition of lawyers from the 
Tribunal, the fact that the Tribunal itself is not bound by precedent or to give effect to strict 
legal rights.90 
 
The complexity of tenancy law makes compliance difficult. This is especially true for a 
sector dominated by “mum and dad” landlords. There needs to be greater education of 
landlords if there is going to be improved property management in the PRS. Confusion 
arising from the different contractual arrangements made in the PRS and subjective 
interpretations of the ‘reasonableness’ requirement illustrates the importance of regulations 
that are framed in a way that makes it easy to secure the compliance of the regulated 
community. 
 
2 Monitoring compliance  
 
There is a lack of viable interim options for tenants when the landlord has failed to meet 
their obligations under the RTA. Unlike several other jurisdictions, tenants in New Zealand 
are not allowed to withhold rent if, for instance, the landlord has failed to perform essential 
repairs to the rental property.91 The tenant faces the problem of the landlord refusing to do 
the repairs or not being able to contact the landlord to do them. If the tenant does withhold 
rent for a period longer than 21 days then the landlord is within their rights to apply to the 
                                                 
87 Jeffery v Houia [2013] NZ TT Christchurch 3389. 
88 See Sarah Bierre, above n 27, at 14-15. 
89 Residential Tenancies Act, s 45(1)(b). 
90 At s 85. 
91 Compare the uncompromising position under New Zealand’s Residential Tenancies Act, s 40(1)(a) with the 
grounds for withholding rent established in the New York case Semans Family Ltd. Partnership v. Kennedy, 675 
N.Y.S.2d 489 (N.Y. City Civ. Ct., 1998). 
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Tribunal to terminate the tenancy.92 Similarly the general position is that the tenant is not able 
to end the tenancy as a response to other incidents of poor property management unless they 
give the correct notice or apply for an order from the Tenancy Tribunal.93 
 
The tenant is permitted to get repairs done themselves if the issue is “likely to cause 
injury to persons or property or is otherwise serious and urgent” and the tenant has made 
reasonable efforts to contact the landlord.94 However many tenants are not in the financial 
position to cover the cost of doing the repairs themselves. This is especially so given that they 
have to continue to pay full rent during this period.  
If the repairs are not urgent the tenant may apply to the Tribunal for a work order.95 
Tenants have to serve a “14 day (written) notice to remedy” on the landlord if they wish to 
access the Tribunal.96 On top of the 14 days requirement is the time for service (four working 
days for post) and usually 4-5 weeks to get a hearing at the Tribunal.97 The total process is 
potentially drawn out to more than 7 weeks if the parties cannot agree to mediate the dispute. 
Ultimately it may be that the landlord cannot do the repairs because of financial hardship. In 
such cases work orders or compensation do not provide meaningful forms of redress for the 
tenant.   
The one circumstance where the tenant is relieved of their responsibility to pay rent is 
when, due to a reason other than the tenant’s breach of the tenancy agreement, the premises 
are destroyed or are so seriously damaged as to be uninhabitable.98  This is a very high 
standard and therefore its usefulness as an interim remedy is limited. A property that was left 
without electricity for 5 days, water or sewerage for 10 days or a usable toilet for 3 weeks did 
not meet the standard to be declared “uninhabitable” and subsequently the obligation to pay 
full rent during this period remained.99  
                                                 
92 Residential Tenancies Act, s 55(1) 
93 At ss 50, 51 and 56. 
94 At s 45(1)(d). 
95 At s 78(1)(e). 
96 At s 56(1)(b). 
97 Catherine Harris “Tenancy Tribunal delays cost landlords” (16 July 2012) Stuff.co.nz 
  < http://www.stuff.co.nz/business/money/7287019/Tenancy-Tribunal-delays-cost-landlords> 
98 Residential Tenancies Act, s 59. 
99 Watkin v Brazier Property Investments Limited & Joan Hazelhurst [2012] DCR 186. 
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Priority is given to landlord’s entitlement to receive rent even when they are not carrying 
out their duties. The approach reflects a regulatory scheme that does not effectively monitor 
compliance and only steps in to address tenancy issues once they have become so serious as 
to threaten the tenancy agreement as a whole. This devalues the significance of any remedy 
the tenant ultimately achieves. The merits of allowing tenants to withhold rent as a response 
to poor property management will be considered below within the context of the proposed 
registration scheme.100 
 
The State does play a limited role in monitoring trouble landlords. Within the Ministry of 
Business, Innovation and Employment (MBIE) are the Outbound and Compliance Services 
Team and investigating officers who investigate on-going or repeat breaches of the RTA.101 
By examining patterns in the information available to them from bonds, tenancy agreements, 
Tribunal orders online and complaints lodged with MBIE directly, internal compliance units 
are able to target particular problem areas. In 2014, through examining tenancy agreements 
submitted to MBIE, the compliance unit was able to contact relevant landlords to let them 
know that their tenancy agreements contained unlawful clauses and that those clauses would 
be of no effect.102 This has the potentially advantageous consequence of ensuring that the 
contacted landlords no longer use those terms on future tenants and also to pre-empt disputes 
over such terms arising between landlord and tenant. However the powers of the compliance 
unit are restricted in that rely on information such as agreements and bonds being submitted 
to them by the landlord or tenant. The unit does not have jurisdiction outside of the RTA and 
their work cannot result in a direct remedy for an individual complainant.103 Yet it does 
indicate a degree of oversight in a regulatory system that is predominantly focused on 
responding to individual claims as will be seen in the Enforcement section immediately 
below. 
 
 
3 Enforcement 
 
i The tenant as enforcer 
                                                 
100 See discussion at VFII. 
101 Paul Davies “Residential Tenancies Act 1986 Compliance Unit – its role and function” (paper presented to 
the Christchurch Housing Forum, Christchurch, June 2014). 
102 Ibid. 
103 Ibid. 
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Breaches of the RTA by private landlords are enforced in most circumstances only 
because a current or previous tenant has made a Tenancy Tribunal application and the 
Tribunal finds in favour of the tenant.104 Because tenants, in deciding whether to bring a 
claim, are primarily motivated by their personal interests, they are ill-suited for the role of 
disciplining landlords who pose a threat to the public more generally. 
 
Firstly the tenant claimant is in most cases prohibited from being represented by a lawyer 
at the tribunal.105 While this may encourage tenants bring claims because it reduces 
associated costs and facilitates the Tribunal’s vision for justice that is not tied down by legal 
niceties,106 it has the collateral effect of making it difficult for a number of tenants to 
successfully present their claims. There are an increasing number of tenants for whom 
English is a second language and for whom it may be difficult to communicate their concerns 
to the Tribunal without a lawyer.107 Many tenants have family responsibilities which may 
pose an obstacle to them attending and preparing for a Tribunal hearing.108 A legally 
represented tenant or representatives of the State itself are likely to be in a stronger position 
to challenge rogue landlords than the lay tenant. 
 
Secondly tenants do not have meaningful protections against the landlord retaliating 
against them for making a complaint relating to the tenancy. The fear of repercussions 
discourages tenants from bringing claims and may in fact be reflected by the 
underrepresentation of tenants bringing claims at the Tribunal.109 The provision in the RTA 
invalidating termination notices given by the landlord in retaliation to a tenant’s complaint is 
not effective.110 Even if the Tribunal decides to declare a particular notice invalid, the 
landlord could serve another notice terminating the tenancy shortly after, forcing the tenant to 
make a whole new claim if they are unsatisfied.111 The tenant faces difficulty in making the 
claim of retaliation itself. Proving the motivation of the landlord can be problematic if the 
                                                 
104 Under s 77(1)(a) the jurisdiction of the Tribunal is limited to disputes between the landlord and the particular 
tenant involved in the dispute.  
105 Residential Tenancies Act, s 93(2) 
106 At s 85(2). 
107 See Department of Building and Housing, above n 1, at 11. 
108 Ibid. 
109 Ministry of Housing Statement of Intent 2004 (Wellington 2004) at 15 and Lyndon Rogers Paper Walls: The 
Law that is Meant to Keep Rental Housing Healthy (Anglican Life, Christchurch, 2013) at 30-31. 
110 Residential Tenancies Act, s 54. 
111 See Rogers, above n 109, at 30-31. 
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landlord can point to other explanations for termination. Because of the power imbalance 
between landlords and tenants, psychological pressure is also likely to play a role in 
discouraging tenants from making complaints against their landlord.112 
 
Thirdly tenants can become disinterested in pursuing a work order. The landlord under 
the RTA is given the option to offer to pay the tenant rather than do the necessary work.113  
Taking a pay-out and terminating the tenancy may be more attractive to a tenant than staying 
and putting up with the inconvenience and hassle of living in a property that is undergoing 
repairs, especially when those repairs would mean that the tenant has to move out of the 
rental property for a period of time. The result of this is that the rental property can be leased 
to the next tenant without the necessary repairs being done. The personal interests of the 
tenant claimant do not serve the interests of future tenants. 
 
Similarly there does not appear to be any cases or Tribunal orders where the tenant has 
relied on section 109A to restrain the landlord from “committing a further [unlawful] act of 
the same kind”.114 This provision could potentially be used to restrain a landlord from leasing 
a property until the necessary work is done because an order granted under this section is not 
limited to the particular tenancy and can last for up to 6 years.115 The fact that tenants do not 
use this section illustrates a lack of interest in what happens to the rental property after they 
have left it or have settled with the landlord. Tenants are therefore not well placed to control 
landlords who persistently breach the RTA. 
 
ii The State as enforcer 
 
The alternative to the tenant bringing a claim against the landlord is that the State does. 
The State is an appropriate enforcer given that the provision of adequate housing is arguably 
a responsibility of the State.116 In practical terms the State can bring the necessary resources, 
expertise and objectivity to act in the public interest.   
                                                 
112 Ibid, at 30. 
113 Residential Tenancies Act, s 78(2). 
114 This was concluded from a search of the Tenancy Tribunal Database on “Search Tenancy Tribunal orders,” 
Ministry of Justice, http://www.justice.govt.nz/tribunals/tenancy-tribunal/search-tenancy-tribunal-orders, 
entering the terms “tenancy+tribunal+order+s+109A” into the Google search engine and referring to Rogers, 
above n 5, at 25. 
115 Residential Tenancies Act, s 109A(3). 
116 New Zealand has assumed an obligation to provide adequate housing to those within its jurisdiction by virtue 
of ratifying international human rights law such as the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
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However when the RTA was being passed it was argued that the State’s role in 
disciplining should be rolled back with less criminal offences being used to punish 
landlords.117 The rationale being that it was important to ensure speedy resolution of tenancy 
disputes and that criminal sanctions were unduly harsh on landlords who have simply 
“slipped up” or were inexperienced.118 Particularly in New Zealand inexperience can be 
explained by the fact that many people become landlords by accident through inheritance or 
otherwise.119 Is it fair to criminalise such landlords?  
 
Landlords assume responsibility over the wellbeing of their tenants and the gravity of the 
potential harm done by a careless landlord provides a justification for criminal sanction to 
enforce substantive obligations. In 2014, for example, a tenant died because a landlord 
illegally installed a gas cooker that caused a house fire.120 Further the coercive powers of the 
State may provide a more meaningful response to poor property management than the 
landlord simply compensating after the fact or “paying the tenant off” to avoid doing repairs. 
It seems necessary to restrain landlords who repeatedly breach tenancy laws given the ease a 
landlord has in re-letting a poorly managed or sub-standard property under the current 
regime.  
 
In terms of claims at the Tribunal, the State will only intervene if it considers it is in the 
public interest to do so.121 To do so MBIE can file a cross application against a landlord at 
the Tribunal and pursue an exemplary damages claim.122 The Ministry of Housing (now part 
of MBIE) used this power when it discovered repeated incidents of a landlord illegally taking 
payments from tenants in a supposed ‘rent to buy’ scheme.123  
 
Yet overall the current regulatory scheme depicts a general reliance on tenants to bring 
complaints against landlords. The State’s support of tenants in this role is limited to cases 
                                                                                                                                                        
Rights. See United Nations “Status of International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights”<http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV-3&chapter=4&lang=en> 
and International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 1966, Art. 2(1). 
117 Property and Equity Law Reform Committee. Report on Residential Tenancies, May 1985 at [11]. 
118 Ibid at [74]. 
119 See Department of Building and Housing, above n 1, at 17. 
120 Robert Kidd “Landlord sentenced over woman's death” (25 May 2014) Stuff.co.nz  
<http://www.stuff.co.nz/national/crime/10199060/Landlord-sentenced-over-womans-death> 
121 Residential Tenancies Act, s 124. 
122 Ibid. 
123 Steve Maharey “‘Rent to buy’ dangers highlighted” (press release, 19 May 2003) 
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which they regard to be in the public interest. This is unsatisfactory because many tenants are 
not in a suitable position to enforce property management standards. 
 
B Conclusion 
 
In 2014 alone the Tribunal disposed of over twenty thousand cases, which was 69 per 
cent of new business in the tribunals and authorities administered by the Ministry of Justice 
in New Zealand.124 It reflects a regulatory system orientated around responding to individual 
disputes as they arise rather than taking steps to prevent them from the outset. The current 
system has created this problem because of the lack of systematic quality checks on landlords 
and their properties and a lack of an effective means to combat repeat offenders. 
 
V REGISTRATION  
 
This essay looks to find a way to lift property management standards in New Zealand by 
using regulation. Given that private landlords are in a favourable position in the market in 
that there is a high demand for their properties and alternatives such as state housing and 
home ownership are often out of reach for tenants, there is insufficient pressure from the 
market to compel landlords to improve their standards.  
 
Similarly the current regulatory regime does not significantly alter landlord behaviour in a 
way that delivers quality housing for tenants. It is a system that focuses on responding to 
individual complaints as they arise rather than putting in place means to prevent those 
complaints arising in the first place. 
 
 It is thought that a regulatory framework with a registration scheme at its centre may be 
able to raise property management standards because it reverses the overly optimistic 
assumption that underlies the current regime. A complaints-based system assumes that a 
landlord is a suitable person to lease their property and that the property is safe to live in until 
a complaint is made. A registration system takes the more cautious assumption that a landlord 
is not a fit and proper person to lease their property and that the property is unsafe to live in 
until the landlord can prove otherwise. Only when the landlord has shown this, can they lease 
                                                 
124 “Annual Statistics Specialist Courts and Tribunals June 2014” Courts of New Zealand 
 <https://www.courtsofnz.govt.nz/from/statistics/annual-statistics/june-2014/specialist-courts-and-tribunals> 
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or continue to lease their property. In this way registration proactively seeks to eliminate 
substandard landlords and unsafe properties from the PRS. 
 
A What is registration? 
 
At the most general level registration is the formation of a list of people or things that meet 
the entry requirements of the list.125 Because they have met these requirements, others are 
encouraged to deal with these people or things exclusively.126 Prospective members are 
incentivised to meet the necessary qualifications for registration because of the desirability of 
being seen as a member or because of other entitlements membership brings.127 The risk of 
being removed from the list encourages the continued compliance of its members.128  
 
B Regulatory Goals 
 
Registration may provide an effective means of altering the behaviour of private landlords 
because, using the criteria identified in section I:  
 
1 Securing Compliance: Registration secures compliance from the regulated community 
because the entry requirements for registration provide a guarantee that all the landlords or 
properties entered into the register meet a certan standard, at least at the time of registration. 
 
2 Monitoring Compliance: A register of landlord or their properties provides the regulator 
a large source of information about the PRS and a means for regulators and tenants to contact 
landlords. It also facilitates the State taking action before more serious enforcement steps are 
necessary. 
 
3 Enforcement: It is thought that registration would competently manage breaches of 
tenancy law because the regulator itself takes responsibility for enforcing breaches. However 
                                                 
125 Oxford University Press “Register (noun) (definition 1)”  Oxford Dictionaries  
<http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/register> 
126 See discussion of the grant of licences from the State to individual utility enterprises in Bronwen Morgan and 
Karen Yeung An Introduction to Law and Regulation: Text and Materials (Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge, 2007) at 3.2. 
127 Ibid. 
128 Ibid. 
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registration is not completely successful in this because the consequences of enforcement still 
fall on the tenant as will be seen. 
 
1 Securing compliance  
 
Registration seeks “to eliminate undesirable behaviour by designing out the possibility for 
its occurrence”.129 In a regime where all landlords have to join the register in order to lease 
their property and only “good landlords” are accepted for registration, “bad landlords” would 
supposedly no longer exist because they would never be accepted for registration. 
 
Yet in Scotland mandatory registration of private landlords has not had such a 
comprehensive effect on property management standards. A survey five years after the 
scheme had been in operation found that less than half of local authorities believed that it has 
improved property management and property conditions in the private rented sector.130 The 
reason why registration cannot exclude all “bad landlords” is because landlords are able to set 
up letting arrangements incognito, advertising their properties to small groups of people. To 
work effectively registration relies to a large extent on landlords en masse co-operating and 
buying into the scheme.  
 
Further there is still a need to monitor the behaviour of “good landlords” or housing 
quality to check that they continue to meet that description. New tenancies introduce new 
dynamics which could provoke otherwise “good landlords” and it is clear that housing quality 
deteriorates overtime.  
 
Registration cannot lift property management standards by itself because it is procedural 
measure that looks at a landlord’s conduct or a property’s condition as a whole. It does not 
address compliance with specific obligations contained within tenancy law. There remains a 
need for the complaint-based system such as the current regime.131 It is suggested that a 
registration system is formulated to complement the current regime.  
    
2 Monitoring compliance 
                                                 
129 Ibid at 3.2.5. 
130 Freya Lees & Dr. John Boyle Evaluation of the Impact and Operation of Landlord Registration in Scotland 
(Scottish Government Social Research, July 2011) at 2.6. 
131 See Morgan, above n 126, at 3.2.1. 
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Registration utilises communication-based techniques of control by redressing the 
informational imbalance in favour of the landlord and providing a means for landlords to be 
contacted.132 A centralised system where private landlords are required to provide details 
relevant to the tenancy upon registration would open up avenues for the State to monitor the 
PRS.133 For instance MBIE would have a greater ability to contact individual landlords to 
advise them of new laws and how they apply, investigate complaints or to explain areas of 
confusion. This is important because under the current regime the emphasis is on landlords 
and tenants taking the initiative to learn about their rights and obligations. There is a 
presumption that landlords are fit to lease their properties to the public. This may not be true 
of the many “mum and dad” landlords that dominate the sector and who manage their 
properties in an ad hoc and unprofessional way.134 There is also a barrier of complexity that 
arises from the multiple sources of law which are relevant to tenancies.135   
 
Registration can reduce the informational asymmetry which disadvantages the tenant. 
Listing the landlord’s contact details on a register would aid the tenant in contacting the 
landlord when problems arise. The tenant could also check if they were uncertain as to 
whether the person they are dealing with is in fact the landlord and not actually another tenant 
or someone else without the proper authority to grant a lease.136 Tenants are thereby put in a 
more informed position vis-à-vis the landlord. 
 
However the benefits of communication should not be overstated. Communication is 
simply a means of indirectly putting pressure on private landlords to influence their 
behaviour.137 Information once communicated may be disregarded or forgotten. Further it 
may be largely redundant given that under the present regime many landlords lodge a bond 
with MBIE or provide an address to the tenant and are therefore potentially contactable.138 
Nevertheless a greater level of communication between private landlords and the State by 
                                                 
132 Ibid at 3.2.4. 
133 See Lees, above n 130 at 2.5 
134 See discussion at IIB. 
135 IVA1. 
136 This is important because under s5 of the Residential Tenancies flat mates and tenants living in the same 
property as their landlord or the landlord’s family are excluded from the protections of the Act. 
137 See Morgan, above n 126, at 3.2.4. 
138 All landlords are required to lodge bonds under s 18 of the Residential Tenancies Act, approximately 
500,000 bonds transactions take place each year see Paul Davies “Residential Tenancies Act 1986 Compliance 
Unit – its role and function” (paper presented to the Christchurch Housing Forum, Christchurch, June 2014).  
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virtue of the former’s registration may still facilitate greater education of landlords and 
reduce breaches of tenancy legislation.  
 
A key weakness identified in the current regulatory framework is the lack of interim 
options for tenant.139 This means that tenants can only avail themselves after a serious breach 
has occurred. A scheme where registration is contingent on the property passing inspections 
would enable the regulator to identify issues with housing quality long before the tenant must 
file a complaint or the costs of repair have become too expensive for the landlord to repair. A 
study of Greensboro, North Carolina where a rental property registration schemes operates, 
saw a 61% decrease in complaints from tenants after two years of the scheme operating.140 A 
decrease in residential fires was also observed, a result that may be linked to practices such as 
inspectors checking fire alarms and wiring.141 Greensboro illustrates the effectiveness of a 
scheme which has the oversight to target issues before they result in harm to the tenant or 
conflict between the landlord and tenant. 
 
3 Enforcement 
 
A scheme requiring the registration of all landlords or rental properties could give the 
State a range of enforcement options to manage compliance that are not available under the 
current complaint-based system. It is important that the regulator has enforcement options 
which are legally and politically appropriate to meet the degree of uncooperativeness from 
the regulated group.142  
 
i Late registration fees 
 
Late registration fees are charged to landlords who apply to register after the required 
time frame to register has lapsed. Such landlords undermine an accurate and comprehensive 
register. In Ireland the late fee is twice the standard fee to register.143 Because these landlords 
have ultimately complied with the scheme, they represent a low level of uncooperativeness 
                                                 
139 See discussion at IVAII. 
140 Way, Heather K., Stephanie Trinh, and Melissa Wyatt, An Analysis of Rental Property Registration in 
Austin. (Prepared for Green Doors, Austin, Texas, July 2013) at 2. 
141 Ibid. 
142 See Morgan, above n 126, at 4.3.  
143 “Registration FAQ’s” Private Residential Tenancies Board <http://www.prtb.ie/landlords/helpful-info-
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and this should be reflected in the reasonableness of the additional fee. Given that the 
introduction of a mandatory registration scheme would represent a major change to how 
landlords lease their property in New Zealand, due regard should be had to allow time for the 
mostly amateur landlord population to adjust.144  
 
Nevertheless ignorance of the law does not excuse. A late fee is a justifiable incentive for 
landlords to register early; it does not pose a significant restriction on a landlord’s ability to 
lease their property. Further in jurisdictions like Scotland prior warnings are always served on 
the landlord, so it is understandable that authorities in most cases do not allow let late fees to 
be waived or challenged by landlords.145 
 
ii Removal of a subset of the landlord’s rights 
 
Where the threat of a late registration fee is insufficient to compel compliance, the 
regulator is justified in taking more coercive steps to require cooperation. The next step in a 
number of regulatory schemes has been to remove a number of the rights landlords would 
otherwise have. Scotland’s Rent Penalty Notice takes away a landlord’s right to collect rent 
while the notice is in force.146 Since rent payments are a landlord’s main income from leasing 
their property, this represents a severe financial limitation on the landlord. 
 
Can such notices be effective against an errant landlord when it is the tenant who is called 
upon to refuse the landlord rent? As discussed earlier, the suggested move away from tenants 
as enforcers is based on their limited ability to challenge a “bad” landlord.147 A landlord, who 
has already refused to register, may similarly disregard a rent penalty notice. A tenant who 
attempts to rely on such a notice is likely to face significant pressure and intimidation from 
their landlord for doing so.148 
 
Because of its restrictive nature, it is fair that a Rent Penalty Notice is appealable and that 
rent is backdated if the notice is found to have been served in error.149 This raises significant 
problems for tenants who have relied on the notice and no longer have the funds to pay back 
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the rent presently owing.150 The challenges tenants have in relying on Rent Penalty Notices 
undermine the ability of these notices to influence the behaviour of landlords. 
 
Similar enforcement measures enacted elsewhere have the potential to put tenants in a 
difficult position. In Mesquite, Nevada an unregistered landlord is not able to have water 
services connected.151 In Ireland, unregistered landlords cannot receive the rent-supplements 
meant to make it easier for poorer members of the population to pay their rent.152 These 
enforcement approaches may not appreciate that it is the tenant who suffers the most for the 
landlord’s noncompliance in that they are the ones potentially being forced to go without 
water or having to pay full rent. These measures seek to push tenants out of the properties of 
non-compliant landlords, but do not recognise that this may be a difficult option for the 
tenant. 
 
iii Criminal law 
 
If other options are exhausted, the State may look to prosecute landlords. Criminal law 
uses the threat of public censure, financial penalties and potentially a restriction of a person’s 
liberty to compel compliance.153 The use of these substantial punishments to enforce 
registration may be disproportionate if criminalisation is justified on the basis that harm is 
caused to others.154 However criminalisation can also be justified on the basis that harm is 
highly likely to result from the activity as can be seen from crimes such as drink-driving or 
speeding. The consequence of a landlord failing to register falls into this latter category and 
aligns well with tenancy as a latent health and safety issue because it recognises the risk 
poorly managed properties pose to the public.155  
 
However the use of criminal penalties on landlords who fail to meet the requirements of 
the scheme can be problematic. This is illustrated by a number of the rental property 
registration schemes that operated in the United States. Under such schemes, all landlords 
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had to have their properties inspected before they could be registered.156 The schemes 
imposed a criminal penalty on landlords or tenants who refused entry to the officials who 
completed the inspections.157 This was found to be in breach of Fourth Amendment 
protections against unreasonable searches, landlords were being criminalised for not 
submitting to what were in effect warrantless searches.158 Developments in the United States 
suggest that simple noncompliance with the obligation to register may not be enough by itself 
to justify criminal penalties. There must be something more that points to the fact that the 
particular landlord leasing their property poses a threat to others by doing so. 
 
The schemes that were deemed unconstitutional were later amended to allow landlords 
and tenants to legally refuse searches, and if they did so, inspectors would be required to seek 
a warrant.159 Even so the protection from unreasonable searches afforded by the warrant 
process is nominal at most. The Supreme Court has held that specific knowledge of the 
condition of the particular dwelling is not necessary for inspectors to be granted a warrant.160  
 
The meaningfulness of prosecution as a deterrence is challenged by the difficulties 
authorities have had in bringing claims against landlord. In 2010 it cost the Edinburgh 
Council between £2000 and £3000 to successfully prosecute an unregistered landlord who 
failed to register three of his properties.161 The landlord was fined only £65 for each 
property.162 Another challenge to successful prosecutions is the significant numbers of 
tenants who are unwilling to give evidence against their landlords for fear of 
repercussions.163As has been already described there are significant difficulties in defining 
and punishing landlord retaliation.164  
 
The cost and associated challenges in gathering evidence may mean that it is not feasible 
for regulators to comprehensively prosecute non-compliant landlords. New Zealand could 
consider giving regulators wide investigatory powers to gather evidence and to prosecute 
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landlords. Otherwise an ineffective prosecution process would mean that criminal law 
becomes less of a deterrent and therefore lacking in power to alter the behaviour of landlords 
who are intent on avoiding registration.  
 
Again the use of criminal law demonstrates how the pressure on tenants to give evidence 
or to submit to arguably invasive searches means that the burden of enforcing tenancy law 
does not substantively shift from the tenant under the current regime to the State under the 
proposed registration scheme. 
 
iv Deregistration  
 
The ultimate enforcement tool regulators have against uncooperative landlords is to take 
away their rights to be a landlord by refusing to register them. Despite it being the regulator’s 
most powerful tool, it is rarely used. In the first seven years that landlord registration 
operated in Scotland only 40 landlords were refused registration.165 This cannot reflect the 
number of “bad” landlords in a sector when hundreds of thousands of landlords operate.166 
Similarly in Richardson, Texas, the city inspected nearly 700 properties in 2012 and only one 
property failed to pass.167  
 
One reason for low rates of deregistration may be because it is seen by regulators as “a 
last resort,” only to be used in the most serious cases.168 If it is continually viewed as such, 
the rule risks lapsing into disuse, with uncooperative landlords disregarding it as a mere bluff. 
A more optimistic analysis would be that the low rates of deregistration can be explained by 
the fact that regulators, as has been seen above, have a series of increasingly coercive tools 
that follow the increasing uncooperative landlord. Therefore it could be said that many 
noncompliant landlords have already yielded in the face of increasing pressure from the State 
before they reach the point where deregistration is necessary.169  
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While deregistering landlords or the landlord’s property is designed to protect tenants 
from poor property management, this action directly displaces their tenant through no fault of 
their own. This may have a serious effect on family life or the tenant’s work life. A way 
Scotland has tried to mitigate this consequence is by requiring deregistered landlords to end 
their tenancy according to their agreement with the tenant.170 However if a landlord has a 
fixed term arrangement with the lease continuing to the end of the year or longer, this could 
mean that an unregistered landlord can continue leasing his property for a significant time 
after deregistration. A suitable response may be to set a statutory maximum period for which 
a landlord can continue to lease their property following deregistration. Nevertheless there 
remains a conflict between respecting the tenant’s contractual rights to stay in a property and 
efficiently removing “bad” landlords from the sector. 
 
v Conclusion 
 
The proposed regulatory shift from a complaint based system to one where the State uses 
the framework of registration to regulate landlord behaviour was thought to relieve tenants of 
the burden of being enforcers. Arguably this has not been seen. As the regulator imposes 
stricter obligations on the landlord under the registration scheme, the results is an increasing 
burden on the tenant to the point where they are displaced from the property itself. 
 
 
C     Structuring a registration scheme 
 
1 Legitimacy 
 
The effectiveness of a rule can be determined by how well it is received by those whose 
behaviour it purports to influence.171 If a rule is perceived as unfair, unreasonable or 
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otherwise unjust, the potential response from the regulated group could range from criticism 
and resistance to disobedience.172  
 
The fairness or justice of a rule on a group can be calculated by reference to whether the 
rule helps that group reach their goals.173 The somewhat irreconcilable problem identified 
within the tenancy relationship is that landlords and tenants are pursuing different and 
conflicting goals.174 The landlord wants rules that help them to earn money and to save 
expenses incurred from the tenancy.175 While the tenant wants rules that help them get value 
for their rent payments by making the landlord incur expense to make the rental property 
more amenable.176  
 
Therefore a key issue challenging the legitimacy of registration is the perception that it 
unfairly favours one of the parties to the tenancy agreement over the other. New Zealand in 
particular has a history of tenancy regulation being criticised as “pro-tenant”.177 The Property 
and Equity Committee in their investigations of the PRS found that landlords:178 
 
seem[ed] to believe that the power of the State [was] being directed against them as a social class.  
 
The potential for this feeling of bias to manifest in uncooperative and evasive behaviour 
is demonstrated by the following excerpt from this 1984 newsletter of the Landlords 
Protection Association Inc., Auckland:179    
 
Avoid approaching the Housing Corp.180 for advice since it will be slanted in favour of the tenant. 
Do not discuss your ideas and affairs with any officer as you may entrap yourself. Do not answer 
questions put to you by their officers should they ring you but find out all you can without disclosing 
anything and then require it sent to you by letter. If summonsed do not plead guilty but have your 
lawyer engender delay by using the blockages in the judicial system. If your lawyer won't play that 
game or is not helpful then ring your Association and we will give you the name and telephone 
number of our honorary barrister and solicitor.  
                                                 
172 Ibid at 3.10. 
173 See Morgan, above n 126 at 3.2.5. 
174 See discussion above at III. 
175 Ibid. 
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Be clever and do not raise rents in breach of the regulations, simply adopt a new approach and do 
things outside the scope of the regulations. 
 
This newsletter was circulated before the RTA and its amendments were passed so may 
be of limited usefulness in reflecting the feelings of landlords towards the current regime. 
However what it does show is how conflict has arisen because of the different ways the 
tenancy agreement is interpreted by landlords and tenants.181 On a general level it illustrates 
the importance of the regulated group accepting the proposed regulations as fair and just. If 
regulations are not accepted as such then, as this newsletter suggests, the regulated 
community may attempt to avoid or otherwise undermine the regulator.  
 
The legitimacy of registration, in its mandatory form, may be attacked as unjust by 
landlords because of the comparatively few benefits it brings to them as compared to tenants. 
While a landlord being on the register gains the reputational benefit of being seen as having 
met the register’s standards by potential tenants, registration represents an additional cost to 
property investors. Not only in registration fees but also in the money spent in order to meet 
the standards required for registration.  
 
Deregistration, from a mandatory scheme, has the drastic effect of preventing a landlord 
from leasing their property and being criminalised if they persist in doing so. The process of 
registration represents added bureaucracy for landlords where there was previously none. 
Commenting on mandatory insulation, Andrew King of the Property Investors' Federation 
used the analogy of the “stick and carrot” approach to influencing behaviour. He argued there 
was no reward (carrot) to counterbalance the punishment (stick).182 A similar argument could 
be made against requiring landlords to register before they lease their property. 
 
A related argument from the landlord’s perspective is that mandatory registration is an 
unfair limit on the freedom of “good landlords” in order to deal with the small number of 
“bad landlords”. A commenter from Penn Hills, Pennsylvania, where a registration 
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ordinances has been passed by the council, thought that “it's a shame good landlords are 
going to get hit”.183  
 
However it is not entirely accurate to portray the PRS as a conflict between good and bad 
landlords or for that matter, commercial and “mum and dad” landlords. The groups are all 
unified by the objective fact that they are in the business of leasing property to the public. 
Differences in quality are tempered by a subjective lens that the law cannot fairly distinguish 
upon without introducing unnecessary uncertainty. For example saying that commercial 
landlords are those who lease more than five properties and the rest are amateur begs the 
question why “five properties” is decided upon as being the basis for a distinction that does 
not objectively exist. The principle of rule of law requires that rules apply equally to all.184  
 
The response that tenants are treated differently, in that they do not have to register, can 
be dismissed by reference to the fact that landlords and tenants play inherently different roles. 
It has been seen that landlords play a public role in that they are delegates of the State, while 
the tenant is limited by their personal interest in the housing.185 
 
2          A public register  
 
Registration may also be attacked as an illegitimate restriction on the basis that it 
represents a threat to the landlord’s privacy in that information about a landlord or their 
property is published on a register. The landlord has little choice as to who sees the 
information, and if they want to be a landlord, then they have to agree to the release of this 
information.  
 
Arguably the information on the register needs to be public to allow viewers to make 
judgments about the landlord. This is potentially harmful if details on the register are listed 
incorrectly or there is a delay in details being updated. Another fear is that information on the 
register could be used for improper purposes such as stalking and other reasons unrelated to 
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the tenancy.186 Yet an official register may be preferable to the status quo of amateur “bad 
landlord” or “bad tenant” websites where reviews are based on opinion rather than an 
objective process conducted by the State.187  
 
The intended purposes of a public register include tenants being able to use it to identify 
and contact their landlords if there is a problem.188 This is particularly an issue where an oral 
agreement is made or contact addresses are lost or changed. It assures tenants that who they 
are dealing with has the authority to gain a lease and that they are living in a compliant 
property or under a “fit and proper” landlord. Information on the register gives greater power 
to the State to investigate problems in the private sector.189 
 
Some schemes have adopted methods to limit improper use of the register. Scotland may 
not have done so very effectively. Anyone who knows the address of a rental property 
registered under the scheme can enter those details into the search engine on the scheme’s 
website.190 The results which are returned are the landlord’s name, whether the landlord has 
any repairing standard enforcements outstanding and a contact address.191 Such information 
arguably needs to be made available to the public generally to prevent a prospective tenant 
moving into a property which does not meet quality standards. The publication of landlord’s 
address can be seen as necessary for the service of documents relating to the tenancy or 
Tribunal proceedings. Yet one cannot search by using the landlord’s name by itself, the 
postcode from one of their rentals must be identified as well.192 This may have some impact 
on preventing speculative searches. 
 
Inefficiencies in updating the website to reflect landlord’s compliance may be unfair on 
the landlord. A tenant who sees that the landlord is yet to be registered may infer that the 
landlord does not meet the requirements of registration. Given the size of the PRS in New 
Zealand, a drastic action such as requiring the registration of all landlords will undoubtedly 
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mean that processing delays will develop such as those that continued for at least four years 
when landlord registration came into effect in Scotland.193  
 
In contrast the Republic of Ireland’s tenancy register cannot be used by members of the 
general public to identify a landlord, excepting the present tenant.194 A neighbor who wishes 
to contact a landlord to resolve a matter directly affecting the neighbor may, on application to 
the registrar, be given the contact details of the landlord.195 Such a case may be in order to 
make a noise complaint against the landlord’s tenant. This scheme’s narrow focus protects 
the landlord’s right to privacy, while respecting the interests of third party affected by the 
operation of the tenancy. The one disadvantage of this narrow focus is the inability of 
prospective tenants to confirm the status of the landlord whom they seek to sign a tenancy 
agreement with.  
 
3 What is registered?  
  
Two examples of registration are landlord registration in Scotland and rental property 
registration in the United States. Evaluating how well these schemes meet their regulatory 
goals may provide insights into how New Zealand could structure their own registration 
scheme.  
 
The two systems pursue distinct regulatory goals. Landlord registration has aims to alter 
the behaviour of landlords who advertently or inadvertently breach tenancy law. This is 
purported to be achieved by the regulator ensuring that only landlords who are “fit and 
proper” persons are allowed to lease their property. Rental property registration seeks to lift 
the quality of housing in the PRS by requiring all rental properties to meet a certain standard. 
The necessary corollary being that all properties in the PRS are routinely inspected. 
 
i Landlord registration in Scotland 
 
The main issue with requiring the registration of landlords is that it may not be clear who 
actually manages the property. The landlord may use an agent or give a tenant the authority 
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to sub-let the property. The interchangeability of personnel may mean that while the person 
listed on the register formally meets the requirements of the register, the reality is that 
another, potentially unscrupulous, person is managing the property. 
 
In Scotland agents are not legally obligated to register but the landlord must register and if 
they are using an agent, this fact must be disclosed to the registrar as well as proof that the 
agent is a “fit and proper” person.196 A weakness in this scheme arises from the fact that a 
landlord who would otherwise fail the “fit and proper” test can still be accepted for 
registration if it satisfies the registrar that their use of an agent will lead to fit and proper 
letting for the tenant.197  
 
While there are checks on the actual property manager, the Scottish scheme may 
underestimate the influence the landlord has over their agent. The fact that the property 
manager is employed by the landlord introduces a conflict of interest which may impede the 
agent in managing the property in a fit and proper manner. This may be true where the agent 
is a friend or family member. Further the agency contract itself may be set up in a way that 
severely limits the ability of the agent to manage the property independently of the landlord. 
However the Scottish scheme does make clear that there may be some landlords who will not 
be accepted even with an agent.198 
 
 
 
 
a.            Requirements on registration – the fit and proper person test   
 
There are issues around what should be required of a landlord and/or their agent before 
they are accepted for registration. As has been referred to above, Scotland uses the standard 
of “fit and proper” person as a ‘hurdle’ to registration. The assessment is made by the local 
authority where the landlord intends to lease their property. The following evidence is 
relevant:199  
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• offences involving fraud, dishonesty, violence, drugs, discrimination, firearms, or 
sexual offences 
• breaches of law relating to housing and letting 
• failure to act in relation to antisocial behaviour; or antisocial behaviour by the 
landlord, the tenant, or at the property 
• breaches of the repairing standard 
• concerns and other information which come to the local authority’ s attention in 
relation to a property, through its other functions. 
 
The above suggests an approach which regards past behaviour as an accurate predictor of 
future behaviour, a particular focus being on preventing repeat offenders from registering. 
This focus may help remove the worse landlords from the sector but only once they are 
identified as such. Problematic landlords who pressure tenants into settling in private or 
resolving disputes through mediation may remain undetected. There is also the risk that 
landlords give false information about their history, but authorities under the Scottish scheme 
do have the power to require a criminal record certificate or to otherwise investigate if 
suspicions arise.200 While the focus is primarily on the behaviour of the landlord, the 
relevance of breaches of the repairing standard to eligibility for registration potentially has 
positive flow on effects for housing quality in the PRS.  
 
A barrier to the “fit and proper” test being an acceptable means of regulating landlords is that 
it is ultimately a subjective judgment, weighing up the different factors. This means that what 
is “fit and proper” to one person is different from what is “fit and proper” to another. Without 
a consistently applied test, there is less confidence that those listed on the register will 
maintain the confidence of tenants generally.  
 
This problem is demonstrated in Scotland where there has been inconsistency in how the “fit 
and proper” test is applied by the different local authorities.201 The result is that landlords can 
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be authorised to lease their property in one area but be denied to do so in another area.202 
However local authorities are encouraged to share information on applicants which decreases 
the chance that decisions are made on a local authority having a lack of information.203 The 
problem of inconsistent application may be mitigated in New Zealand if a centralised system 
of registering landlords was adopted. 
 
While looking at the past behaviour of the landlord may help to reduce the number of 
landlords who intentionally breach tenancy law, it may not be as effective in protecting 
tenants from first-time landlords who inadvertently breach tenancy law through ignorance or 
inexperience. This is an issue for New Zealand given the large number of “mum and dad” 
landlords and the compliance difficulties identified above.204  
 
An alternative may be to require landlords to pass a rudimentary test of their knowledge 
of tenancy law before they are allowed to lease their property to the public. This would serve 
as an indication and assurance that prospective landlords have a basic understanding of their 
rights and obligations. Provided that the answers to the test are unambiguous, this option may 
be able to be more consistently applied than a subjective analysis of the landlord’s character 
as knowledge of tenancy law can be objectively determined through multi-choice tests. 
However this testing would only address the behaviour of inadvertent offenders and would do 
little to stop advertent offenders for which the “fit and proper” test remains superior at 
dealing with. 
 
Because of the investigation necessary to assess whether a landlord is “fit and proper” 
administrative delay has been a main challenge facing landlord registration in Scotland.205 
This has created tensions with the landlords awaiting registration.206 A test of tenancy law, 
particularly an online multi-choice test could be processed almost immediately, enabling a 
landlord to proceed with its registration. The results of tests, such as commonly wrong 
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answers, could provide valuable information on the sector that could be used to inform the 
State of problem areas. 
 
b.           Conclusion 
 
The Scottish system of landlord registration faces obstacles in influencing the behaviour 
of landlords who lease their properties. This is because of the inconsistency in which the “fit 
and proper” person test is applied and the ease at which a change in personnel can cloud the 
identity of the true, and potentially less scrupulous, property manager. Rental property 
registration improves on these two drawbacks albeit it does so in the pursuit of quality 
housing rather than the influencing the behaviour of landlords.  
 
ii Rental Property registration in the United States 
 
The regulator could focus on registering the rental property subject to it meeting certain 
standards of quality. This would necessitate widespread inspection of properties in the PRS, 
an expense which is commonly perceived as excessive.207  
 
a. Justifications 
 
Rental property registration is advantageous for the regulator because it does not give rise 
to the difficulties landlord registration has in defining its subject matter. In the absence of the 
landlord fraudulently or mistakenly registering the wrong address, registration of rental 
property locates a readily discoverable and immutable asset.  
 
In terms of reaching the regulatory goal of quality housing, rental property registration is 
a direct and thus efficient way of regulating. Ensuring a house meets a certain standard is a 
methodical task; it could be achieved by reference to a checklist. In contrast suitability of a 
person to managing a property is a much more difficult quantity to measure. If housing 
quality is one of the goals of landlord registration, it is an indirect one at best, relying on the 
promise that improved property management will manifest itself in better housing in the PRS. 
Rental property registration achieves this result in a more direct fashion. 
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Requiring the registration of the rental property can be justified on the basis that it asks no 
more of the landlord than for them to prove to the State that they are abiding by pre-existing 
obligations under the RTA. Specially, the obligation to provide and maintain the premises in 
a reasonable state of repair and the obligation to comply with the requirements in respect of 
building, health, and safety laws.208 
 
 In contrast landlord registration sees the regulator making decisions, not necessarily as a 
response to an outstanding breach of the RTA, but from a subjective assessment of the 
landlord’s history. From a critical perspective the scheme could be seen as punishing 
landlords twice for their offences, particularly in cases where registration can be revoked on 
the basis of offenses unconnected to property management as is the case in Scotland.209 
 
b. Inspections  
 
Under the rental property registration schemes in the United States, inspection is 
controversial condition of registration. Requiring that all rental properties must be inspected 
before they can be leased and inspected regularly hence is arguably a substantial intrusion on 
the property rights and privacy of tenants and landlords. The repugnancy of this measure to 
rule of law principles arises from the state not needing evidence of non-compliance or a 
breach of tenancy law to carry out such inspections.  
 
Yet tenancies raise potential health and safety issues and similar inspections are 
conducted in relation to places where food is sold.210 However arguably there is a greater 
expectation to privacy in a rental property than in a restaurant based on the fact that the 
former is a private residence, while the latter is open to a potentially large customer base. 
Notably inspectors under the Food Act 1981 are expressly forbidden from entering and 
inspecting dwellinghouses.211 This may be taken to illustrate that while rental property is 
technically the site of the landlord’s business, so to speak, it is distinct from other businesses 
in the eyes of the law. 
                                                 
208 Residential Tenancies Act, s45(1)(b). 
209 See Antisocial Behaviour etc. (Scotland) Act 2004, s 85(2). The Registrar may consider any offence 
involving fraud or other dishonesty, violence or drugs. 
210 Food Act 1981, s 12. 
211 At s 12(2)(a).  
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Section 21 of the New Zealand Bill of Rights 1990 provides a protection from 
unreasonable search and seizure. The section involves balancing public interests against 
private interests.212 As discussed above, tenants increasingly conceive the tenancy as being 
their private home and it well established that reasonable expectations of privacy are higher 
in the home than in public places.213 It is natural that tenants should want to keep private the 
contents of their home and their personal and family activities free from intrusions by the 
State.214  
 
However the tenant’s reasonable expectation to privacy must be lower than that of 
individuals who live in owner-occupied homes. The tenant is under the present New Zealand 
regime obliged to allow access to their landlord and his or her agents to inspect the property, 
to check if the tenant has completed work and to do maintenance work.215 The tenant does 
not have a right to refuse the landlord entry if the landlord has given the required notice.216 
Nevertheless both owner occupiers and tenants consider where they are living as their home 
and it seems unfair to discriminate on the basis of tenure. 
 
There is a real concern that if inspectors have the authority to test rental property for 
housing quality they will report the tenant for things unrelated to their mandate.217 Inspectors 
are put in the compromising position of respecting a tenant’s privacy or ignoring 
unacceptable conduct. Therefore despite legislation preventing the disclosure of certain 
information about the tenant, the reality is that there is a risk that such information could 
nevertheless be leaked to others in gossip or to the media.218  
 
Red Wing, Minnesota, where rental property registration operates, promises landlords and 
tenants that the City will generally not share information about the rental property or its 
                                                 
212 Bill of Rights Act 1990, s 21. 
213 See discussion at IIIC and R v Simmons [1988] 2 SCR 872.  
214 Patrick J. Kelly and Bennett Evan Cooper “Brief of Amici Curiae Cato Institute, Reason Foundation, 
Minnesota Free Market Institute at the Center of the American Experiment, Electronic Frontier Foundation, and 
Libertarian Law Council in Support of Appellants” (27 September 2012) for McCaughtry et al v City of Red 
Wing  808 N.W.2d 331 (Minn.2011) at 5-6. 
215 Residential Tenancies Act, s 48. 
216 Ibid. 
217 See Kelly, above n 214, at 19-20. 
218 Ibid. 
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occupants obtained through inspections with any law-enforcement agency.219 However 
exceptions are made in relation to methamphetamine labs and mistreatment of other 
people.220 There is no principled reason why these offences and not others, such as burglary, 
are reportable by inspectors.221 Such an arbitrary approach undermines the rule of law. Red 
Wing inspectors are also obliged to disclose information “as required by law”, which 
increases the range of information gained from inspections that can be used against the 
landlord or tenant.  
 
The landlord has a much lower expectation of privacy of the rental property than the 
tenant. In most letting arrangements, they do not occupy the rental property. They are not 
able to exclude the tenant except in accordance to the tenancy agreement and the RTA.222 
Advertising the property generally and encouraging prospective tenants to inspect the 
property before signing a tenancy lowers the landlord’s reasonable expectation to privacy.223 
Further it is not reasonable for landlord to believe that they have an interest in keeping private 
the fact of their noncompliance with health and safety and building laws.224 The conception 
of landlords as delegates of the State, suggests that landlords should submit to the quality 
checks the State would conduct if it was leasing the properties itself.225 
 
There is a strong public interest in the State conducting inspections on private rental 
property. As has been expanded on above, New Zealand’s rental property is generally inferior 
to owner-occupied stock.226 Therefore in the interests of health and safety, there is a need to 
inspect these properties. Further it has been seen that the complaints procedure under the 
RTA is insufficient to raise housing quality. Firstly tenants often lack the technical expertise 
to identify housing quality issues.227 Secondly they lack the confidence to bring a claim with 
the threat of retaliation not assuaged by the RTA and thirdly they are primarily concerned 
with their personal interests, rather than the threat a noncompliant property has to the public 
                                                 
219 Rental Dwelling Licensing Code 2011, § 4.31, subd. 1(3)(q).   
220Ibid. 
221 See Kelly, above n 214, at 19-20. 
222 Residential Tenancies Act, s 63. 
223 Butcher v. City of Detroit, 401 N.W.2d 260, 264 (Mich. Ct. App. 1986) (“Many inspections will occur just 
prior to sale when the structures are vacant and the owner’s expectations of privacy are relatively low.”) 
224 City of Vincennes v Emmons, 841 N.E.2d 155, 159 (Ind. 2006) at 7. 
225 See discussion at IIIF. 
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227 See Way, above n 140, at 6. 
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generally.228 The unreliability of the complaints process suggests a need for the State to 
inspect all properties in the PRS, not only those where there has been a complaint.  
 
Clarity around what inspectors are authorised to examine is important so that landlords 
are given guidance as to what they need to do and so tenants and landlords do not feel that 
inspections are too invasive. The RTA obligation to provide the premises in a “reasonable 
state of repair” does not give sufficiently specific guidance to inspectors because, as has been 
discussed, the meaning of the word “reasonable” is open to conflicting interpretations.229 
Ambiguity in the inspector’s mandates creates a risk that the privacy interests of the tenant 
and landlord are unnecessarily infringed.230 An example to follow may be that of Richardson, 
Texas where inspectors are given a list of 42 criteria to check the property against, with 
properties having to meet a certain score overall.231 The criteria include checks on plumbing, 
electricity and sanitary conditions.232 A list can clearly define what inspectors are to look at 
and provides an objective measure for deciding whether the property meets or fails the 
inspection. 
 
Rental property registration should be structured in a way that infringes on private 
interests only so far as necessary to realise the public interest. One way to do this would be to 
follow the lead of Houston, Texas and limit inspections to the exterior of the property.233 This 
would be a less invasive method of inspection, but the trade-off would be the information 
able to be gathered from such an inspection. A follow-up interior inspection could be justified 
on the basis that an inspector has a reasonable suspicion of issues or if the exterior inspection 
fails.234 This would defeat criticism that entry into a tenant’s private residence is simply a 
“fishing expedition”. 
 
Intrusions on privacy could also be minimised by conducting inspections only before the 
tenant moves in. However given that long-term accommodation is required by a number of 
tenants and that housing quality decreases overtime, there is a need to regularly inspect the 
                                                 
228 See discussion at IVAIII 
229 See discussion at VAI. 
230 Residential Tenancies Act, s 45(1)(b). 
231 See Watkins, above n 167. 
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property. Typically re-inspections in the United States are conducted every 3-5 years.235 To 
respect the privacy of tenants there should be some flexibility in re-inspection dates to fit 
around the start and end of tenancies. 
 
VII CONCLUSION 
 
This essay suggests that in New Zealand market forces cannot by themselves improve 
property management in the PRS. Private landlords are in a powerful position vis-à-vis 
tenants with the nation’s increasing reliance on the PRS due to declining rates of home-
ownership and reduced social housing.  
 
The increasing reliance on private landlords is a cause of concern because there are no 
restrictions on who can lease their property. This has meant that landlords who incompetently 
manage sub-standard properties have become a real problem. In the interests of the growing 
tenant population, property management standards need to be improved. 
 
Having identified the issue, it was asked why the State should intervene in what are, in 
substance, private business transactions. It was argued that adequate housing is a commitment 
that New Zealand has assumed by virtue of adopting international law, that there is precedent 
for state intervention where there is an inequality of bargaining power and that tenancies 
create health and safety issues which it is in the public interest for the State to address. 
 
Having evaluated New Zealand’s current regulatory scheme it was found that the system 
is unsatisfactory as a means of lifting property management standards. The current system is 
undermined by the false assumption that all landlords competently manage their properties 
until a tenant’s complaint suggests otherwise. The reality is that an amateur landlord 
population faces difficulties in complying with the various obligations imposed under 
tenancy law. A similarly unskilled tenant population are relied on to hold landlords 
accountable for their breaches, but it is clear that tenants are not competent to effectively 
carry out this responsibility. 
 
                                                 
235 See Way, above n 140, at 1. 
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What can be learnt from the current approach is that the State must play a greater 
supervisory role. Registration is put forth as a regulatory system that provides this necessary 
oversight. It requires regulators to be satisfied that the landlord or their property meet a 
certain quality and to remove them if they do not.  
 
However there are difficulties with registration, in that it creates privacy concerns and 
added bureaucracy. Regulations must be considered as legitimate by the regulated community 
if it is going to create widespread compliance. There are also issues as to how the entry 
criteria for registration are to be applied in a consistent and accurate manner and how 
registration can be structured to lessen the burden that enforcement has on tenants.  
 
Given the lacklustre reception to warrant of fitness proposals in the PRS from the 
government and landlords, a landlord-friendly registration scheme is considered the most 
realistic.236 This scheme could be structured as follows: 
 
Both landlords and their properties would be listed on a register which would be 
accessible to the public generally so that prospective tenants could base their expectations on 
the information held on the register. A rudimental online test of the landlord’s knowledge of 
tenancy law would be the only hurdle required of landlords pending their registration. The 
test would be able to be re-sat until a passing mark was achieved. The testing would have the 
advantages of being applied consistently, limiting the delay and costs of registration and 
illuminating key areas of confusion in the PRS.  
 
Privacy concerns would be met by limiting inspections to the exterior of the rental 
property. But these inspections would be conducted regularly, every 3-5 years, with 
flexibility around tenancy start and end dates. Inspections would be against a list of pre-
determined and publicised criteria.  
 
Interior inspections would be conducted if the inspector has grounds to suspect non-
compliance with tenancy law or the landlord voluntarily submits to an interior inspection. 
                                                 
236 Phill Goff “Phil Goff: Rental homes need a warrant of fitness to keep kids healthy” (14 June 2015) 
Stuff.co.nz. 
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keep-kids-healthy    
 
52 
 
Whether an interior inspection has been completed would be apparent from the register as 
well as information as to when the last inspection was carried out and when the next 
inspection is scheduled. If a tenant is living in a property that fails its inspection, there would 
be a statutory period in which they could live at the property before having to move out. 
 
The proposed system is a compromise in that it does not address landlords who advertently 
abuse tenancy law. However the educational and inspection aspects of the registration 
scheme are hoped to restore confidence in the PRS.  
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